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TWARDOWSKI & REPRESENTATIONALISM
1. INTRODUCTION
My task in this paper is twofold.1 On the one hand, I want to provide
an account of Twardowski’s treatment of content, as can be found in his
book Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894).2 On
the other hand, I wish to make a suggestion about the kind of represen-
tationalist Twardowski was. Presenting what I take to be Twardowski’s
view from the perspective of what has come to be called the philoso-
phy of mind, and particularly from the perspective of perceptual theory,
I will argue that Twardowski’s representationalism was in one impor-
tant respect not the kind of representationalism often (if perhaps er-
roneously) attributed to Descartes; Twardowski’s representationalism
does not amount to what I will call proxy-percept representationalism.
But Twardowski’s theory was in another important respect a descendant
of the Cartesian view. Twardowski conceived representational content
as the principal means of our representation of extra-mental objects:
it is in virtue of their content that representations represent, both per-
ceptually and conceptually. Many traditional, though certainly not all,
representational theories stake such a claim. Twardowski additionally
assumed that at least some contents have what we now call phenome-
nal properties. And Twardowski construed the having of such properties
in an unusual, mereological way. I will devote most of my attention to
motivating Twardowski’s theory. In conclusion I will provide a defense
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of the theory, but even there my “defense” will simply be a straight-
forward appeal to the interpretation on offer: content, as construed by
Twardowski, is not merely a means of representation, but is supposed
to resemble objects mereologically. I want to try to get a better under-
standing of how Twardowski viewed this kind of resemblance.
Comparing Twardowski’s view to Descartes’ is not merely idle. While
the bête noir of 20th Century philosophy of mind, Descartes remains
a central (if unpopular) figure. In what particular ways does Twar-
dowski’s account resemble or fail to resemble (if not Descartes’ ac-
tual treatment of ideas, then) the views most commonly attributed to
Descartes?
Twardowski himself studied Descartes. Twardowski’s doctoral dis-
sertation Idee und Perception (1891) was a careful, forty-two page study
of clarity and distinctness, and was devoted to analyzing the roles these
concepts play in the Cartesian treatments of truth and judgment. These
topics would become a central concern for Twardowski’s own later work3,
and his understanding of them may well have been influenced by his
study of Descartes. So let me begin this brief reflection on Twardowski
with a passage from Descartes:
And finally, even if these ideas did come from things other
than myself, it would not follow that they must resemble
those things. Indeed, I think I have often discovered a great
disparity <between an object and its idea> in many cases.
For example, there are two different ideas of the sun which
I find within me. One of them, which is acquired as it were
from the senses and which is a prime example of an idea
which I reckon to come from an external source, makes the
sun appear very small. The other idea is based on astro-
nomical reasoning, that is, it is derived from certain notions
which are innate in me (or else it is constructed by me in
some other way), and this idea shows the sun to be several
times larger than the earth. Obviously both these ideas can-
not resemble the sun which exists outside me; and reason
persuades me that the idea which seems to have emanated
most directly from the sun itself has in fact no resemblance
to it at all.4
In this passage, Descartes presents an argument to the effect that per-
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ceptual ideas do not resemble the objects they represent. According to
Descartes, when we perceive the sun we are caused to have an idea that
is quite different from the one arrived at through “astronomical reason-
ing.” Nevertheless, the two ideas are of the very same object. Descartes
supposed that they have different contents insofar as one makes the sun
appear “smaller than the earth,” while the other represents the sun as
being “several times larger than the earth.” It is from this difference (in
content) that Descartes concludes that it could not be that both resem-
ble the sun. And it is from this difference (in content), coupled with
further “reason,” that Descartes concludes that at least one of the ideas
“has in fact no resemblance to it [the sun] at all.”
However, despite what Descartes says, it is not at all obvious that it
could not be that both ideas resemble the sun. In particular we should
not jump to this conclusion merely because one of them makes the sun
appear smaller and the other represents the sun as several times larger
than the earth. At the very least it is not “obvious” without a more
precise definition of resemblance. We must ask: how exactly must an
idea match its object in order to resemble it? And we need not press
the question about how the matching is to be determined in order to
see that the theory would be in deep difficulty even if the Cartesian
argument against it had been significantly stronger. I will, presently,
take the important lesson to be the following: the representation of size
is only one (and not a particularly useful) metric for resemblance. Many
things resemble despite dramatic differences in their representations
of size. Two different likenesses might each resemble a person, for
example, despite the fact that one of them represents the person as
being somewhat fatter, or having a somewhat bigger nose. So the real
question arises: if not represented size, what would be a good criterion
for resemblance? On Pitt’s (2000) account:
Like Descartes, few representationalists these days have much
truck with resemblance. It is a traditional assumption among
realists about mental representations that representational
states come in two basic varieties (cf. Boghossian 1995).
There are those, such as thoughts, which are composed
of concepts and have no phenomenal (“what-it’s-like”) fea-
tures (“qualia”), and those, such as sensory experiences,
which have phenomenal features but no conceptual con-
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stituents. . . . Some historical discussions of the representa-
tional properties of mind (e.g., Aristotle 1984, Locke 1689/1975,
Hume 1739/1978) seem to assume that nonconceptual rep-
resentations — percepts (“impressions”), images (“ideas”)
and the like — are the only kinds of mental representa-
tions, and that the mind represents the world in virtue of
being in states that resemble things in it. On such a view, all
representational states have their content in virtue of their
phenomenal features. Powerful arguments, however, focus-
ing on the lack of generality (Berkeley 1710/1975), ambi-
guity (Wittgenstein 1953) and non-compositionality (Fodor
1981) of sensory and imagistic representations, as well as
their unsuitability to function as logical (Frege 1918/1997,
Geach 1957) or mathematical (Frege 1884/1953) concepts,
and the symmetry of resemblance (Goodman 1976), con-
vinced philosophers that no theory of mind can get by with
only nonconceptual representations construed in this way.5
Think of this encyclopedic account as the obituary of resemblance rep-
resentationalism. I do not intend to dispute Pitt’s claims in any direct or
systematic way. Instead I would like to highlight a few of its presupposi-
tions, particularly those relevant for our thinking about resemblance as
criticized by Descartes above, an appreciation of which will benefit our
understanding of Twardowski. First, it is commonly assumed that there
are two basic kinds of representations: those with phenomenal features,
and those without phenomenal features. A second common assumption
is often less explicitly articulated: those representations without phe-
nomenal features are supposed to be paradigmatically conceptual, and
those with phenomenal features are supposed to be non-conceptual,
hence the significant debate in contemporary philosophy of mind con-
cerning whether there are any wholly non-conceptual representational
contents. Third, resemblance is presumed to be particularly associated
with so-called “traditional” theories of representation, and particularly
with accounts of representational content that attribute it phenomenal
qualities. According to David Pitt, it is because of their phenomenal
qualities that representations were traditionally thought to resemble,
and it was because of their resemblance to extra-mental objects that
that they were thought to represent them.
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So how does this inform our interpretation of Twardowski? For one
thing, Twardowski’s account of the representation of objects by content
is also based on the notion of resemblance. The point that I will ar-
gue below, however, is that the kind of resemblance Twardowski had
in mind, while it did require that content have phenomenal qualities,
is nevertheless immune to many of the “powerful arguments” referred
to by Pitt above. I do not aim this discussion at establishing that point
exhaustively, but I will explain why at least two of the most famous ar-
guments against resemblance, arguments provided by Goodman against
the reflexivity and symmetry of resemblance, do not work against a the-
ory like Twardowski’s.
2. REPRESENTATION AND TWARDOWSKI’S DISTINCTION OF
CONTENT FROM OBJECT
The biggest influence on Twardowski’s thought was not Descartes’, but
Brentano’s. The most important thesis Twardowski inherited from Bren-
tano is the foundational role he ascribed to Vorstellungen. So a crucial
task in assessing Twardowski’s theory is that of determining what he
himself meant by ‘Vorstellungen.’ Reinhardt Grossmann discusses the
issue in his introduction to On the Content and Object of Representations:
The crucial German term is ‘Vorstellung.’ This term has a
corresponding verb and allows for such expressions as ‘das
Vorgestellte.’ From a purely philosophical point of view, the
best translation of ‘Vorstellung’ is, in my opinion, the word
‘idea.’ But there is no corresponding verb in English, nor
can we easily translate ‘das Vorgestellte.’ I have therefore
followed the common practice and translated ‘Vorstellung,’
not by ‘idea,’ but rather by ‘presentation.’ But I have done
so with some misgivings; for this translation destroys some
of the philosophic flavor of the text. It fails to stress that
the Vorstellungen of the German (Kantian) tradition are the
ideas of the British (Lockean) tradition.6
The point is not merely a matter of translation. Recent scholarship has
distinguished a distinctively Austrian tradition of analytic philosophy,
including the philosophy of the Brentano School, from the German tra-
dition inaugurated by Kant.7 And despite awkwardness in phrases like
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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“ideating” and “the ideated,” Grossmann’s preferred rendering would
emphasize the heritage of Twardowski’s concept by reminding us of
its connection with the “ideas” of the British (Lockean) tradition, and
thereby more vividly indicating its connection with Descartes. Never-
theless, following the Kant literature, I will adopt the term ‘represen-
tation’ instead. The advantage of this is an understanding of Vorstel-
lungen in a sense not identical to, but directly relevant for, representa-
tions as referred to in our contemporary psychology and cognitive sci-
ences. That said, Twardowski’s Vorstellungen should not be understood
in the tradition of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, but instead as an interme-
diate conceptual form between the ideas of the Early Modern tradition
and representations as we understand them today. Ultimately, we must
think of Twardowskian Vorstellungen as representations because (unlike
other members of the Brentano School) Twardowski explicitly treated
the contents of Vorstellungen as “mental copies” of extra-mental objects,
and as “the means by which objects are represented.”8
Twardowski believed that the term ‘representation’ [Vorstellung] har-
bored a deep ambiguity. On Twardowski’s view, the Brentanian phrase
“represented object [Vorgestellte Objekt]” is sometimes used to refer to
extra-mental objects, i.e. objects properly so-called, but sometimes also
used to refer to mind-dependent contents of representations. And that
distinction constitutes an important point of divergence of Twardowski
from Brentano who, in his Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint,
used the terms ‘content’ and ‘object’ as synonyms.9 Twardowski fol-
lowed Höfler and Meinong in proposing that the term ‘object’ refers
principally to the extra-mental objects of representation, and following
Brentano (or so he thought) proposed to retain the term ‘content’ as a
synonym for “immanent object,” or “intentionally inexistent object,” or
their synonyms, all of which were supposed to refer to something mind-
dependent. Twardowski took up the central thesis of Brentano’s psy-
chology, emphasizing the foundational role Vorstellungen play in con-
sciousness, and added to it the distinction between the mental content
[Inhalt] of representations and the extra-mental object [Gegenstand] of
representations.
Accordingly, one has to distinguish the object at which our
representation is “directed,” from the immanent object [im-
manenten Objekt] or the content of the representation.10
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The content of representation is defined by Twardowski as an “im-
manent object.” By “immanent” I take him to mean dependent upon
a particular mental act. An advantage of this interpretation is that
it sidesteps some of the difficulties involved in interpreting “internal
existence” or “existence solely within the mind,” difficulties frequently
discussed in Brentano scholarship. The distinction neatly tracks our
commonsense notion that the contents of representations (whatever
they might be and however they might be distinguished) belong to the
same basic ontological category as the acts of representation themselves
(whatever they might be and however they might be distinguished),
whereas the objects of representations have no particular propinquity
with the mental. In distinguishing content from object in this familiar
way, i.e. by defining the former as mind-dependent and the latter as
(in many cases) extra-mental, Twardowski taps into a deep realist intu-
ition: that the objects of the world must be sharply distinguished from
our representations of them, including the content of our representa-
tions of them, because those objects may be ontologically unlike their
mental representations, including the contents of those representations.
Twardowski did more than merely take over this roughly Cartesian
distinction. He also based this distinction on an analysis of an even
more general referential ambiguity in the modifiers of noun phrases.
Twardowski argued that ambiguity in Brentanian phrases like “repre-
sented object” and “immanent object” were themselves examples of the
conflation of two different, broadly logical, functions of noun phrase
modifiers.11 Noun phrase modifiers can be adjectives, adjectival phrases
or clauses, or other nouns (especially those in the possessive case). The
logical function of such modifiers is sometimes to designate a subcate-
gory of the things that would have been picked out by the noun-phrase
without the modifier, i.e. sometimes the modifier is used to determine a
particular kind of thing otherwise designated by the noun-phrase that
it modifies. But sometimes it is used to make the original noun-phrase
designate an entirely different category of thing than would have been
picked out without the modifier, i.e. it modifies (even more) the refer-
ence of the noun phrase. In Twardowski’s lingo, such modifiers function
as determining adjectives or modifying adjectives. Compare ‘14 carat’ in
the phrase ‘14 carat gold,’ with ‘fool’s’ in the phrase ‘fool’s gold,’ or com-
pare the classificatory function of ‘pickup’ in ‘pickup truck’ with ‘toy’ in
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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‘toy truck.’ Twardowski’s favorite example of a determining adjective
was the ‘true’ in ‘true friend,’ as opposed to the modifying adjective
‘false’ in ‘false friend.’ According to Twardowski, a true friend is a spe-
cial kind of friend, but a false friend is no kind of friend at all.
The important point for the philosophy of mind, according to Twar-
dowski, is that this unrecognized referential ambiguity lies at the source
of many more specific ambiguities in technical phrases like ‘represented
object’ and ‘immanent object,’ as could be found in places like Brentano’s
Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. On Twardowski’s account, a
“represented object” is no kind of object at all; it is a content. On Twar-
dowski’s account, an “immanent object” is no kind of object at all; it is
a content. In these cases the words ‘represented’ and ‘immanent’ are
working as modifying adjectives.
3. PROXY-PERCEPT REPRESENTATIONALISM
Now consider a particular species of representationalism: proxy-percept
representationalism is the doctrine that mind-dependent perceptual ob-
jects, what Twardowski called “contents,” and what our contemporary
psychologists now frequently call percepts, stand in a representational
relation to extra-mental objects or states-of-affairs, what Twardowski
called “objects,” and what our contemporary psychologists now typi-
cally call the distal stimulus. Descartes has often been taken as a classic
example of a proxy-percept representationalist. The grounds for saying
so are passages where he defines an idea as “whatever is immediately
perceived.”12 But Descartes also demands that ideas serve as states, or
acts, or modes of a finite mental substance. The cognitive faculty that
Descartes called “the understanding” was supposed to have the function
of presenting ideas; and it was supposed to present these either clearly
and distinctly, or unclearly and indistinctly. In the 4th Meditation he ar-
gues that human error, including perceptual error, involves making an
unwise judgment, i.e. being willing to assent to the material truth of an
idea when it is perceived either unclearly or indistinctly. Most relevant
for us here is the fact that on the Cartesian account it is ideas them-
selves that can be the objects of perceptual judgment. When we couple
this thesis with the claim that the ideas are mind-dependent, we are
then exactly two-thirds of the way to what I will define as proxy-percept
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representationalism. The final claim necessary to meet the definition is
that percepts somehow signify or represent distal stimuli. According to
the orthodox reading of Descartes, the objects of perception are mental
representations, and only on that basis can the skeptical question arise:
how do we know that our mental representations are materially true?13
Proxy-Percept Representationalism:
(1) x is the perceptum (i.e. the object of perception);14
(2) x is mind-dependent;
(3) x signifies an extra-mental object or state-of-affairs.
Whether Descartes was committed to (3) is surprisingly difficult to
ascertain. There is an on-going debate about whether Descartes was
a representationalist of the sort that I have defined in the paragraph
above, or whether he was instead some kind of direct realist. For a
relatively recent argument to the former effect see Hoffmann (2002,
163-79). For argument to the latter see Nadler (1989). My task here,
however, is not to commit Descartes to proxy-percept representational-
ism, but instead to assess whether Twardowski was committed to it.
Does Twardowski’s treatment of content make him a representationalist
in the latter sense? As I’ve already indicated above, if it does it cannot
because he rejected (2). That, at least, is made clear by passages such
as the following:
. . . the content in our sense, is not the same as the act. It
does form together with the act one single mental reality,
but while the act of having a presentation is something real,
the content of the presentation always lacks reality.15
In what way, then, does Twardowski’s theory advance upon the Carte-
sian account?
4. REPRESENTATION AND TWARDOWSKI’S PICTURE ANALOGY
When explaining the ambiguity of the expression ‘the represented ob-
ject’ Twardowski appealed to a fruitful, but also potentially misleading,
analogy. According to Twardowski, contents are to objects as pictures
are to landscapes.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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In comparing the act of presenting with painting, the con-
tent with the picture, and the object with the subject matter
which is put on canvas – for example, a landscape – we have
also more or less approximated the relationship between
the act on the one hand and the content and the object of
the presentation on the other. For the painter, the picture
is the means by which to depict the landscape; he wants to
picture, paint, a real or merely imagined landscape, and he
does so in painting a picture. He paints a landscape in mak-
ing, painting, a picture of this landscape. . . . Analogously
for presentations. A person presents to himself some object,
for example, a horse. In doing so, however, he presents to
himself a mental content. The content is the copy [Abbild]
of the horse in a sense similar to that in which the picture
is the copy [Abbild] of the landscape.16
This analogy is meant to make intuitive the proposed difference be-
tween content and object. Contents are not merely “immanent objects,”
abstractly construed; they are also copies of the objects. They are like
little mental pictures of them. The picture theory is an old philosoph-
ical doctrine; it can be found in William of Ockham, for example, and
probably dates back further.17 Twardowski’s own terminology suggests
an identification of his doctrine of content as “copy [Abbild],” with the
traditional doctrine of the “mental picture [geistige Abbild].”18 However,
despite Twardowski’s appeal to the analogy, and despite his various ref-
erences to content as a “copy,” he was not ultimately committed to the
claim that contents are mental images.19 Twardowski clearly repudiated
the claim that contents are pictures, saying that such a claim rests upon
a “primitive psychology.”
A primitive psychology replied readily that the presentation
(in the sense of the content) is simply a mental picture
of the object and assumed that the question was thereby
answered. . . . However, whether it is to be assumed that
there is a kind of photographic resemblance [photographis-
cher Aehnlichkeit] between content and object is a question
which receives nowadays generally a negative answer.20
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Instead, Twardowski followed his teacher Robert Zimmermann, and re-
searchers like Benno Kerry, who judged content to be a kind of “sign”21.
But does that mean that talk of “pictures” and “copies” in Twardowski’s
work must simply be façon de parler, mere conceptual holdovers, relics
from the days of the “primitive psychology?” That was, for example,
Findlay’s interpretation, despite the prominence of pictures in Twar-
dowski’s principal publication.22 But I think that there is more to the
story. To see that there is something more going on here, recall that
the basic function of metaphor is to express similarities between objects
with one another. The basic function of analogies, on the other hand,
is to express the sameness (i.e. the identity) of relations. If someone
makes an analogy, for example that doctors are to human bodies what
auto mechanics are to cars, you cannot prove that the analogy is weak
by simply insisting that human bodies are not cars. To refute the weak
analogy one must do something more, i.e. one must show that the relata
in the analogical case are such that their relationship is wholly different
from the relationship being suggested. Twardowski is not resorting to
mere metaphor; he is deploying an analogy.
On my reading, the picture analogy is used by Twardowski to ex-
press precisely what he conceived as the relation between content and
object, despite the fact that he did not treat contents as pictures. That is
to say, the picture analogy was introduced by Twardowski as an analogy
in the strict sense, the function of which is the expression of a precise
relation. The relation in question here is a kind of depiction, or resem-
blance, even though neither of the two terms are themselves pictures.
I don’t think that this interpretive claim is a particular stretch, philo-
sophically, because we are already quite familiar with resemblances be-
tween things that are not themselves pictures, e.g. family resemblances.
But I also think that there are lots of other resemblance-type relations,
strict depiction included but not exhaustive for the category, that are
not strictly-speaking the “picturing relation,” insofar as none of their
relata are pictures.
The point is not meant to be earth shattering; nevertheless it puts
me into substantive interpretive disagreement with J.N. Findlay. Read-
ing again from Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Values, Findlay argues
that because Twardowski rejected the thesis that contents are pictures,
he thereby could not have held that the relationship between content
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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and object was one of resemblance.23 But that does not follow, at least
not on any interesting understanding of resemblance. Findlay cites ex-
actly the passage that I’ve quoted above as evidence that Twardowski
rejected resemblance for his account of the special relation between
contents and objects. But Twardowski does not reject all forms of re-
semblance in the passage quoted above. Twardowski merely rejects,
more specifically, a relationship of “photographical similarity.”
Let us consider again why the picture theory was attractive to “prim-
itive psychology” in the first place. Representational content was con-
strued not only as a symbol or sign, but as a simulacrum, a stand-in for
an extra-mental object inside the mental domain. We are familiar with
symbolic uses of pictures as representational tokens for things pictured.
Pictures and pictured are frequently interchanged, a symbolic displace-
ment that can occur despite stark differences in the material of which
pictures and pictured are composed. For example, the little man with
his foot slightly raised on a walk sign at an intersection stands in for
people crossing that intersection at the appropriately coordinated mo-
ment. The people themselves, busy crossing the street, could not possi-
bly be put into a sign. We need something else to stand for them doing
what they are supposed to be doing at the appropriate moment, an in-
dicator not made of flesh and bone but instead of white or green lights,
for example. Likewise, the horse being “pictured” may have been flesh
and bone, but its picture may be of paint and canvass, or ink and paper,
or chalk and slate, perhaps even the stuff of consciousness (whatever
that stuff might prove to be). The appeal for “primitive psychology”
was this conduciveness of depiction to representational displacement;
the pictorial representation is useful precisely because it can be realized
in a variety of media. So long as we continue to insist that the mental
and non-mental be sharply divided from one another metaphysically,
the actual horse will not be able to get inside consciousness. And that’s
what the mental pictures were supposed to be for.
However, we do not need pictures in order to perform the pictur-
ing function. If what is important for the representational displacement
is the relation across the material media, then all that we need is the
form that the picture and the pictured share. This was Twardowski’s
advance on “primitive psychology.” There are many different relations
that pictures share with things pictured, and hence many different pos-
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sible kinds of depiction. But the one that Twardowski’s analogy meant
to express is the sameness of the relation of the parts of the content to
the whole of the content, with some of the parts of the object to the
whole of the object.
But as soon as there occurs an analysis of the object into
its parts, and it is noticed that just as the object has cer-
tain parts, so the content of a presentation can be ana-
lyzed into constituents which correspond to the parts of the
object, there appears immediately a new relationship be-
tween content and object. This relationship consists in this,
namely, that the parts of the object are presented through
constituents of the content in a way which is determined
by the manner in which the parts of the object are united
into a whole, uniform object. Hence there is an analogy
between the composition of the parts of the object and the
composition of the constituents of the content, an analogy,
to be sure, of a rather peculiar nature, one which is deter-
mined by the relationship of being presented between an
object and a content.24
So the kind of depiction that is at the basis of Twardowski’s represen-
tationalism is a shared mereological relation, i.e. the sameness of the
relationship between parts of the content and the whole content, with
some of the parts of the object and the whole object. We must be care-
ful to notice here that Twardowski restricts his claim to only some of
the parts of the object. It was not Twardowski’s view that a content, no
matter how sophisticated and rich it might be, could ever exhaustively
represent an object in all of its relations to its parts. Objects always
have too many parts for a content to represent them all, no matter how
deeply resolved or elaborate the content’s fineness of grain. The ideal
of such a representation, one that represents everything about an ob-
ject, is what philosopher’s of the Brentano School called an adequate
representation. But Twardowski, like his contemporaries, denied that
there could ever be an adequate representation of an object. The im-
mediate consequence of such a claim is that the parts of the object of
any representation must be divided into two broad classes: those that
have analogues in the parts of the content that represents the object of
which they are parts, and those that do not. It was the former group
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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alone that Twardowski called characteristics.
5. TWARDOWSKI AND GOODMAN
What this means is that the special resemblance relation is, according
to Twardowski, quite unlike other resemblances proposed in the his-
tory of philosophy. One consequence is that it does not fall victim to
many of the standard criticisms of the “traditional” theory, for example,
some of the criticisms made famous by Nelson Goodman in his book
The Languages of Art (1976). The following quotation presents only the
first pair of a panoply of arguments that Goodman mustered against the
claim that resemblance is either necessary or sufficient for representa-
tion:
The most naive view of representation might perhaps be
put somewhat like this: “A represents B if and only if A ap-
preciably resembles B”, or “A represents B to the extent that
A resembles B”. Vestiges of this view, with assorted refine-
ments, persist in most writing on representation. Yet more
error could hardly be compressed into so short a formula.
Some of the faults are obvious enough. An object resembles
itself to the maximum degree but rarely represents itself; re-
semblance, unlike representation, is reflexive. Again, unlike
representation, resemblance is symmetric: B is as much like
A as A is like B, but while a painting may represent the Duke
of Wellington, the Duke doesn’t represent the painting.25
The first argument is that resemblance is reflexive, but that represen-
tation is not. Therefore resemblance is not representation. Even if
one were sympathetic with the conclusion of this argument one might
still be suspicious of its soundness, if not by dint of the dubiousness of
Goodman’s claim that things resemble themselves, then at least because
it confuses resemblances between things with resemblances between
things, on the one hand, and their representations, on the other. Let
us grant, for a moment, that a painting of the Duke of Wellington (for
example) does not represent itself. Would we be any more inclined to
say that it resembles itself? Goodman, at least, was inclined to say so.
It would not be too much to interpret him, on the basis of this passage
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alone, as claiming that for any object (and not merely a painting of the
Duke of Wellington) the object resembles itself more than it resembles
anything else. I take it that this is what he meant by saying that “an ob-
ject resembles itself to the maximum degree.” But why should we agree
to this claim? We should be reminded (as Twardowski would agree)
that we need to give a more precise definition of resemblance, if saying
such a thing is to be warranted.
Of course, I do think that things can resemble themselves, for ex-
ample through time. But that should not be confused with the sort of
resemblance that Twardowski was talking about. When we recognize
the face of an old friend, even though that face may have changed, we
are basing our recognition on the resemblance of a face that we see
before us with a remembered face from long ago. But that is not at
all the same as saying that the very same face resembles itself. In one
circumstance Twardowski would say that we are comparing a content,
i.e. the face that we now remember, with another content, i.e. the
face of our friend as it is presently seen by us. And that is quite differ-
ent from the question of whether the face presently before us does or
does not in fact resemble itself now more than it resembles itself as it
used to be. What is most important for Twardowski was that we not
confuse either of those two different sorts of relationship with a third:
the resemblance of the content (of what is either seen or remembered
by us) to the actual object. So let us simply grant that objects resem-
ble themselves “to the maximum degree,” and thereby that one sort of
resemblance, i.e. the resemblance of an object to an object (itself) as
conceived by Goodman, is reflexive. Does it follow that another sort of
resemblance, i.e. the resemblance of contents to objects insofar as they
share a form, e.g. as conceived mereologically by Twardowski, must
also be reflexive? We cannot know the answer to that question without
knowing more precisely what Goodman meant by resemblance. What
is important for Twardowski’s theory is that a particular content, e.g.
the face that I see before me now, resembles to some degree the face
that is actually there. And that is what makes it a representation of
that face. Goodman has given us no special reason to believe that the
reflexivity, which (we have granted here for the sake of argument) char-
acterizes resemblances of objects to one another, and to themselves “to
the maximum degree,” also characterizes the particular resemblance re-
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lationship between contents and objects as articulated by Twardowski.
And unlike Twardowski, he seems to be conflating quite different kinds
of relations.
The second argument is that resemblance is symmetric, and that
representation is not, and therefore resemblance is not representation.
But this argument clearly does not apply to Twardowski’s account of
resemblance, because the resemblance relation defined above is asym-
metric. Recall that for Twardowski, a content represents an object
only if some of the relations between the parts of the object and the
whole object are the relations between the parts of the content and the
whole content. It is that particular feature of Twardowski’s theory that
makes the relationship between contents and objects asymmetric. The
contents represent the objects (but not vice versa) because all of their
mereological relations can be found in the object (but not vice versa).
This may indeed be a unique feature of mental representations, insofar
as it seems impossible that any representational relationships between
extra-mental objects (with one another) could ever possess this prop-
erty. Nevertheless, it is this peculiarity of Twardowski’s theory, whether
it ultimately recommends the theory or does not, that makes it quite
impervious to Goodman’s symmetry argument.
6. CONCLUSION
In summary, Twardowski was a representationalist. For Twardowski,
mental content is not, except when we are engaged in introspection,
the object of an act of consciousness. Content is instead that through
which the object is perceived, i.e. a means for representation. Despite
similarities with Descartes in treating the contents of representation as
mind-dependent, Twardowski treated contents (much more clearly than
Descartes did) as signs for extra-mental objects. So, returning to the
definition of proxy-percept representationalism, i.e.:
Proxy-Percept Representationalism:
(1) x is the perceptum (i.e. the object of perception);
(2) x is mind-dependent;
(3) x signifies an extra-mental object or state-of-affairs.
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We can safely conclude that if Twardowski was not a proxy-percept
representationalist, it cannot be because he denied either (2) or (3).
He affirmed both (2) and (3) quite directly. If Twardowski was not a
proxy-percept representationalist it can only be because he denied that
mental contents are perceptual objects, i.e. insofar as he had begun
to shy away, like many 20th Century representational theorists, from
(1). Twardowski was most unique, however, insofar as he treated con-
tents as depicting their objects via shared “property relations,” defined
mereologically. I am not particularly wedded to calling Twardowski’s
account a kind of resemblance representationalism, but it seems to me
fair to call it such, as long as one keeps in mind that he did not appeal
(in any way, despite what Husserl said!) to pictures, and that his ac-
count of resemblance was asymmetric. In conclusion I would also like
to point out that while contents of this sort can admit of phenomenal
qualities, they need not have phenomenal qualities in order to resemble
in this quite particular, Twardowskian way.
Notes
1 This paper was originally read at a meeting of the History of Early Analytic Philos-
ophy Society, at the American Philosophical Association Central Division, in Chicago on
April 17th, 2008. I am indebted to the other participants, Robin Rollinger, Peter Simons,
Arianna Betti, and to its organizer, Sandra Lapointe. I’m especially indebted to Professor
Lapointe for her keen editorial assistance.
2 Kazimierz Twardowski. 1894. Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellun-
gen: Eine psychologische Untersuchung. Wien: Alfred Hölder. Translated as Kasimir Twar-
dowski. 1977. On the Content and Object of Presentations. Reinhardt Grossmann (trans.).
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Subsequent quotation is of Grossmann’s translation, with
my minor modifications. Hereafter abbreviated (Twardowski 1894/1977).
3 English translations of a variety of Twardowski’s papers are collected in (Twardowski
1999).
4 (Descartes 1641/1984), 27.
5 (Pitt 2000).
6 Reinhardt Grossmann, “Introduction” to (Twardowski 1894/1977), vii-viii.
7 See (Smith 1994), especially 1-5.
8 (Twardowski 1894/1977), 15-16.
9 Recent scholarship suggests that even Brentano felt the allure of a distinction along
the lines Twardowski suggested. See Rollinger (this volume) on the distinction as it
appears in Brentano’s logic lectures.
10 (Twardowski 1894/1977), 2.
11 This discussion reproduces the one at (Twardowski 1894/1977), 11-17. Reading
this as one of Twardowski’s most significant philosophical analyses, I follow (Wolenski
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1998/99), 15-35.
12 Eg., (Descartes 1641/1984), 127.
13 The Meditator of the 6th Meditation would endorse (3), for example, but the Medi-
tator of the 1st Meditation endorses only (1) and (2). What I am calling “proxy-percept
representationalism” is more often called “the veil of ideas,” which is a much better name
for it, I admit (judged by evocative standards.) I beg readers’ pardon for using this uglier,
somewhat more descriptive, name.
14 The “perceptum” appealed to here should not be confused with a percept, which
combines both (1) and (2), and is thereby a particular kind of perceptum. As I am using
the terms, a percept is a perceptum that is also mind-dependent. I have taken care to
choose this more general (i.e. neutral) term, not only to avoid begging the question
against the direct realist, but also to help illuminate (in the subsequent section of this
paper) Twardowski’s particular brand of representationalism.
15 (Twardowski 1894/1977), 29.
16 (Twardowski 1894/1977), 15-16.
17 See (Ockham 1317/1990), 41.
18 He uses this language throughout (Twardowski 1894/1977); for a few examples see
7, 14, 16. He uses “psychischen Inhalt” synonymously; e.g., 16. Twardowski also uses
the phrase “mental picture,” albeit less frequently and more hesitantly, sometimes within
scare quotes, sometimes without. See, e.g., 7.
19 I have not been clear on this point in my earlier writings about Twardowski. See,
for example, Hickerson (2005), 466-72, or Hickerson (2007), 49-54. I am grateful to
Arianna Betti for making me see the point forcefully and friendlily.
20 (Twardowski 1894/1977), 64.
21 See (Twardowski 1894/1977), 2, 7, 64-65.
22 See (Findlay 1963), 8-17.
23 See (Findlay 1963), 8-17. Thankfully, we may not be completely at odds: Findlay
leaves open the possibility, on 15, of a “shadow of resemblance.” But it is no mere shadow,
I insist!
24 (Twardowski 1894/1977), 65.
25 (Goodman 1976), 3-4.
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